The effect of crude oil price change and volatility on Nigerian economy by Demachi, Kazue
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effect of crude oil price change and
volatility on Nigerian economy
Kazue Demachi
Kobe University
31. July 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41413/
MPRA Paper No. 41413, posted 18. September 2012 14:21 UTC
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
The Effect of Crude Oil Price Change and Volatility on Nigerian Economy 
 
Kazue Demachi 
Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University  
Research Fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (DC2) 
 
2-1 Rokkodai-cho, Nada, Kobe, Hyogo, 657-8501, Japan. 
+81 (0)78-803-7267 
k.demachi@stu.kobe-u.ac.jp 
 
Abstract 
This study analyses the effects of changes in the international oil price 
and price volatility on the macro-economy of an African oil exporter, 
Nigeria. Applying the five-variable Structural Vector Auto Regression 
(SVAR) model to monthly data series from January 1970 to May 2011, 
impulse response functions are calculated to see the influences among 
the crude oil price, Nigeria’s exchange rate, money supply (M2), 
domestic price levels (CPI) and the policy interest rate (Discount Rate). 
The estimation results suggest that Nigeria’s exchange rate is affected 
not only by the changes in the international oil price but also by its 
price volatility. M2 increases as a response to an oil price increase, 
which suggests that as the international oil price rises there is a huge 
increase in the money supply into the domestic market from the 
national oil company and international oil companies, which are the 
largest suppliers of dollars next to the monetary authority itself.   
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1. Introduction 
Many African countries still suffer from poverty and low 
development. African crude oil producers are coming to the forefront as 
new suppliers of natural resources and energy resources. Recent 
economic growth in emerging economies such as China and India puts 
pressure on energy resources in the international market adding to 
people’s anxiety that the world’s oil will soon be depleted. While 
emerging economies are taking what they can from resource-rich 
African countries by using various diplomatic tools, industrial countries 
headed by the United States are also turning to the African oil 
producers. There has been increased attention on African resources 
after the 9.11 terror attack in 2001 as alternative energy suppliers 
other than the Middle East were needed. The increasing demand for 
African oil has brought a new “resource boom” to resource-rich 
countries. Money is flowing into African oil-exporting countries 
regardless of their government’s credibility, security, or their situation 
with respect to the rule of law. The countries receiving investment 
capital are experiencing rapid economic growth, which, however, can 
only be regarded as superficial; it is limited as it is to figures in 
statistical reports. In reality, the majority of the population still live 
below the poverty line. They suffer from internal and external conflicts, 
and their economies are shackled by a poor infrastructure except for 
that which exists in the places where the extractive industries operate.  
 Problems facing commodity-dependent countries, the negative 
impact of international commodity price fluctuations and price 
uncertainty have been debated, in part by dependency theorists such as 
Prebisch and Singer. The underlying problems of economic stagnation, 
in spite of the large revenues received from the sale of their resources, 
*Manuscript
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along with conflict, have been called the “resource curse” (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004: Deaton and Miller 1995: Gelb 1988: Sachs and Warner 
1995). Sachs and Warner argue, from a medium- and long-term 
analysis using annual data, that resource endowment (dependency on 
resource exports) is negatively related to economic growth (Sachs and 
Warner 1995). On the other hand, Deaton and Miller, in comparing 
Sub-Saharan countries using annual time series data, conclude that 
there is no statistically significant difference between the economic 
performance of commodity exporters and non-commodity exporters 
(Deaton and Miller 1995). The same problem is also analysed in the 
light of the political economy, and this paradoxical situation is 
highlighted as the “paradox of plenty” (Karl 1997). The “resource curse” 
debate contains a broad range of topics, but one of the most discussed 
by economists is Dutch disease. When the international price of a 
commodity rises, the exporting country’s currency appreciates, thus the 
country’s non-booming exports lose their international competitiveness, 
so the non-booming sector declines. Moreover, domestic labour moves to 
the booming sector and this also contributes to the decline of the 
non-booming sector (Corden 1984, Corden and Neary 1982, Cuddington 
1989). Another important point regarding the “resource curse” is the 
fluctuation in government revenues due to the uncertainty of 
international commodity prices. While the governments of 
resource-exporting countries usually depend on this resource revenue, 
the unpredictability of trends in commodity prices impedes 
governments from investing in mid- or long- term development. Many 
developing countries’ governments find it difficult to stop or alter 
development projects once started. The collapse of international 
commodity prices forces these governments to rely on external 
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borrowing rather than austerity, which results in increased foreign debt 
(Budina and Wijnbergen 2008).  
 There has been radical structural change in the international 
commodity market and pricing mechanisms in the past. Before the 
1970s, the price of crude oil was determined by the cartel of 
international oil companies, called “The Seven Sisters.” Pricing power 
then shifted to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), but their hegemony was short-lived. With the development of 
the international market for crude oil, after the oil price crash in 1986, 
pricing power moved from OPEC to the open market. Recent 
developments in information technology after the establishment of the 
international market have extended the power of the financial markets, 
and commodities in futures markets are increasingly taking on the 
character of financial products. Movements in the crude oil price today 
correlate more to other commodity prices such as the price of gold, or 
even stock prices, than in the past. The international oil price is a 
reflection of the state of the international economy rather than just 
being information that reflects the position regarding the balance 
between supply-and demand in oil. This paper investigates how the 
price movements of crude oil affect still-struggling African oil exporters’ 
economies. 
 Extractive industries, and not just those to do with crude oil 
extraction, are usually operated by international oil companies. In 
many oil producing countries, these international oil companies form 
joint ventures with the host governments or with domestic companies. 
The influence of these corporations on domestic economies is huge, 
especially in relatively small, developing, commodity-dependent 
economies. The existing literature mostly focuses on the relationship 
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between international companies and the host country’s exchange rates. 
They focus on how these companies circumvent and mitigate the 
currency risk. However, the international companies’ activities and 
influence are sometimes large enough to affect the macro-economy of 
the host country. This is even more true for a developing, oil dependent 
country, where the international oil companies’ behaviour affects every 
aspect of the economy.  
 Based on the questions and motivations above, this paper 
analyses the influence of the international oil price on the 
macro-economy of a Sub-Saharan African oil exporting country, Nigeria. 
The econometric analytical part employs the Structural Vector Auto 
Regression (SVAR) model, using monthly data on the Nigerian 
macro-economy from January 1970 to May 2011. This analysis is 
complementary to the existing literature in that it focuses on shorter 
term economic responses, by contrast with the data frequency 
previously employed.  The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. The next section briefly reviews prior studies. Section 3 is an 
overview of Nigeria’s economy. Section 4 reports on the data, the SVAR 
model, the analytical method and the results. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 Many economists have investigated crude oil price changes, 
fluctuation and uncertainty, and their impact on economic activity, 
especially since the oil crisis in the 1970s. Most of these studies, 
however, focus either on the price movements themselves, or on the 
influence of price changes on the industrial countries’ economies and 
industries, such as in the United States or Japan (Apergis and Miller 
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2009: Hamilton 1983, 1996, 2003, 2008: Kilian 2009: Kim and Roubini 
2000). Studies have also focused on other countries, such as Bjørnland 
(1998, 2009) on Norway, and Ahmed and Wadud (2011) on Malaysia. 
Norway is an exceptional case in that it is heavily dependent on oil 
exports but it is also equipped with well-established financial 
institutions. 
 Some studies distinguish price uncertainty from mere price 
change, assuming that price uncertainty has specific effects on the 
economy. Ferderer (1996) calculates monthly oil price volatility as a 
standard deviation of daily price changes and argues that volatility has 
an explanatory power that can estimate fluctuations in U.S. economic 
output. Ahmed and Wadud (2011), on the other hand, employ an 
Exponential General Auto Regression Conditional Heteroscadasticity 
(EGARCH) model to estimate monthly oil price volatility, apply the 
SVAR model to 1986 to 2009 monthly data, and thus analyze the effects 
of the oil price shock on Malaysia’s industry. They suggest that oil price 
volatility negatively affects Malaysian industrial production. Notably, 
they point out that oil price volatility lowers price levels over the long 
term, and the Malaysian authorities respond to this with an 
expansionary monetary policy to stimulate the economy. The Malaysian 
case is an example of how a government responds to the effects of an 
international oil price shock. In general, developing countries like 
Nigeria, as opposed to industrialized countries, have only limited 
financial tools to implement financial policy, so it is worth looking at 
how the monetary authority of such a resource rich country responds to 
an international oil price shock. 
 
3. Economic overview of Nigeria 
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 Nigeria is an oil producing country which depends on its oil 
income for most of its federal revenue. The share reached 80% in 2008 
(Central Bank of Nigeria 2011, Table B.1.1). The Foreign Trade 
Statistics issued by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics suggest 
that more than 90% of Nigerian exports are crude oil and natural gas 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2011). Moreover, about 97% of foreign 
revenues is from oil and gas (Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 
2008:102). Nigeria began its oil production with Shell-BP in 1957, just 
before independence from the United Kingdom. Oil production at that 
time was only around 20,000 barrels/day, but it increased steadily to 
reach 540,000 barrels/day in 1969. Nigeria established the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation in 1971 and joined OPEC the same year 
(Frynas 1993:16). In 1977, the company was amalgamated with the 
Ministry of Petroleum, and changed its name to the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (Oyrwole and Lucas 2000: 374).  
 The major exports of Nigeria had been palm oil, cacao and 
ground nuts in the 1950s until the agricultural sector started to 
plummet as the oil sector developed in the 1960s (Helleiner 1964). The 
economy experienced a typical Dutch-disease-type structural shift and 
now heavily depends on oil exports. The oil industry is generally capital 
intensive, thus the oil sector is not generating much domestic 
employment. Domestic infrastructure outside the oil sector has yet to 
be developed. A detailed industrial analysis is still lacking, but the 
share of labourers working in the industrial sector is estimated to be 
around 10% and in services 20%. The remainder work in agriculture 
(“Nigeria,” The World Factbook). In 2007, the poverty ratio was 
estimated to be over 70%, indicating that the income generated from oil, 
the national wealth, has not been spread throughout the population 
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(ibid).  
 Nigeria’s exchange rate regime was opportunistic from 
independence in 1960, when it was pegged to the UK pound or the US 
dollar, whichever was stronger and more favourable for imports, until 
the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 
1986 (Egwaikhide et al. 1994, Onafowora and Owoye 2008). In 1986, 
Nigeria shifted to a managed float regime, but this was a de facto dual 
market system, consisting of an official rate and a market rate while 
pursuing integration. The black market flourished in this era, and the 
gap between the official rate and the market rate widened. Suffering 
from radical economic adjustment and economic stagnation as a result 
of cuts in public expenditure, domestic criticism of the SAP peaked, 
forcing the government to retreat from the SAP and re-introduce a fixed 
exchange rate regime in 1994. The next year, Nigeria again shifted to a 
managed float regime and established an Autonomous Foreign 
Exchange Market to boost the integration of exchange rates. In 2002, it 
introduced a Dutch Auction System, and since then the auction system 
has been modified and extended several times in response to economic 
conditions.  
 Nigeria benefited from the two oil price hikes in the 1970s, 
receiving windfall profits like the Middle Eastern oil producers did. The 
huge oil revenues notwithstanding, Nigeria has accumulated foreign 
debt like other non-oil exporters, and it suffered prolonged economic 
stagnation in the 1980s. Literature on the Nigerian experience with the 
SAP points out problems such as poor foreign exchange management, 
that is, the maintenance of a fixed and overvalued exchange rate which 
led to the expansion of the black market, high inflation, ailing 
agricultural exports, a flourishing domestic service sector (Dutch 
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disease), and a chronic budget deficit (Budina et al. 2007: Chibber 1991: 
Pinto 1987,1990). Of these, the budget deficit of the federal government 
is still a serious problem; it exceeded 10% of GDP during the stagnant 
1980s, a decade in which Nigeria experienced negative GDP growth for 
several years. However, the GDP growth ratio has been boosted since 
2000, hitting 7% in 2009, and 7.8% in 2010 (World Development 
Indicators). Nigeria’s balance of payments shows a clear change before 
and after 2000. Especially after 2003, the international balance went 
into surplus as it benefited from rapid growth in exports due to an 
increase in the international oil price. 
 Like other developing countries, one of the main tasks of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has been to control inflation. Prices rise 
quite rapidly even at present, recording an inflation rate in the 
double-digits. The official interest rate (annual discount rate) peaked 
around 1993 at 26%. It has been fluctuating since then and has gone 
down substantially since 2001. It stayed around 6 to 8% in 2011. Katz 
and his colleagues point out that the CBN has been under demand 
pressure from the market despite its efforts to lower the inflation rate 
through its monetary policy (Katz et al. 2004:44). Today, the CBN 
declares that it uses Open Market Operations through bill issuance as 
its main tool to control the money supply, but the movement of the 
Nigerian Treasury Bill rate was closely tied to that of the policy interest 
rate until January 2005. It is thus safe to think that until recently, the 
policy interest rate has been one of the monetary authorities’ most 
important policy tools. 
     One of the major reasons for the increase in the money supply 
in Nigeria is the federal government’s borrowing from the CBN. In 1980, 
domestic financing by the Nigerian government resulted in high 
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inflation. In general, another reason for the surge in the money supply 
is the inflow of oil revenues into the domestic currency market, 
especially when the government’s sterilization policy has not been 
effective enough. This has a particular effect in Nigeria, where the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the 
international oil companies supply US dollars to the domestic market 
as the crude oil price increases and oil revenues soar. The NNPC and 
the international oil companies can be regarded as the second largest 
foreign currency suppliers after the CBN. 
 Information on the capital flow of oil revenues in Nigeria has 
not been disclosed and is out of reach for most citizens. A small amount 
of information, however, has become available since Nigeria joined the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, which was started in 2002 
on the initiative of the former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair. The 
Nigerian EITI (NEITI) has already published two reports on audits of 
financial flows within the oil and gas industry since the launch of 
NEITI in 2004. According to its second report published in 2011, one 
part of several kinds of revenue from taxes on the oil companies for 
their oil sales is paid to local governments in the local currency, the 
naira, and the rest is deposited with JP Morgan Chase in New York in 
US dollars (Hart Nurse Limited 2011). Thus a price hike in 
international crude oil and an increase in oil revenues may indeed lead 
to more money being supplied to the domestic market, but the amount 
of money flowing into the domestic economy in the local currency and 
its size relative to the revenue deposited in the external account is still 
unknown. 
 It is noteworthy that the recent foreign exchange market in 
Nigeria has been active. A press release by the CBN in April 2010 
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reveals that domestic demand for foreign currency increased after the 
financial crisis in 2008; this was especially because foreign investors 
wanted to move funds to their home countries. Moreover, the press 
release points out, the expectation that the naira would depreciate 
along with the decline in the international oil price stimulated 
speculators’ demand for the dollar (Central Bank of Nigeria 2010). On 
the other hand, the NNPC and other major oil companies, such as Shell, 
are reported to have been selling large amounts of dollars into the 
domestic inter-bank market. This supply of foreign currency by 
institutions other than the CBN seems to affect Nigeria’s exchange 
rate.       
   
4. Econometric Analysis  
 Based on the economic background reviewed above, this section 
investigates the impact of the international oil price on the 
oil-dependent Nigerian economy. To analyze the effects of the oil price 
on economic activity, Ahmed and Wadud used variables such as the 
industrial production index (Ahmed and Wadud 2011). However, 
available statistics on Nigeria only offer a crude oil production index. 
CBN’s major objective has been to control the inflation rate, and the 
rate of change in prices can be regarded as important information that 
illustrates the economic state of Nigeria. Therefore the consumer price 
index (CPI) has been employed as a variable. 
 The international oil price is denominated in US dollars, thus 
an oil price increase will lead to an appreciation in the naira through 
the payment for crude oil in US dollars. In addition, the appreciation of 
the currency along with the increase in the oil price improves Nigeria’s 
terms of trade, which stimulates demand for imports, thus pushing up 
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domestic demand for foreign currency. In this analysis, the CBN is 
assumed to have decided to control the interest rate after it observes a 
change in the inflation rate or in the money supply, thus the policy 
interest rate (Discount Rate) and Money Supply (M2) are included as 
variables. Moreover, the exchange rate is an important indicator of the 
economy for an oil exporter, so it is also included.  
 In this analysis, not only is international crude oil price 
volatility distinguished from percentage changes in the oil price (OP), 
but also sharp rises and falls are extracted and separated to make 
alternative variables, a Hamilton Index (HI) and an Inverse Hamilton 
Index (Inverse HI). This enables the analysis on the monetary 
authority’s responses to each price increase and decrease, if any. The 
calculation of volatility, HI and Inverse HI, is explained below. 
 All of the data used in this analysis are taken from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). For the crude oil price, 
nominal price data for Brent oil are used, as Nigerian oil is closely 
related to the Brent oil market. It should be noted that M2 in the 
Nigerian definition seems not to include net foreign assets (M2 minus 
net foreign assets turns negative after 2000). Thus, M2 can be 
understood as a proxy for money within the domestic market.  
 
4-1. Estimation of Crude Oil Price Volatility 
 Changes in the international oil price and price uncertainty, 
namely volatility, show different trends, so it is worth creating 
variables for each. Ahmed and Wadud (2011) employ the EGARCH 
model proposed by Nelson (1991) to calculate crude oil price volatility. 
In the EGARCH model, a negative price shock is evaluated to have a 
larger impact on the conditional variance than a positive shock. As 
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Ahmed and Wadud point out, this model allows an oil price shock to 
have an asymmetric impact on the uncertainty. Moreover, by using an 
exponential form, this model does not require a non-negative restriction 
on the variable. Thus, this analysis also employs the EGARCH model to 
estimate crude oil price volatility. The Brent oil price from January 
1970 to May 2011 is modelled through AR(1) as in equation (1) below, 
then EGARCH(1,1) is applied in equation (2). 
             (1) 
        (2) 
In the equation above,   is residual, and  denotes the conditional 
variance obtained from equation (1). Here, if , it indicates the 
asymmetric character of oil price movements on volatility. This means 
that a negative price shock has a larger influence than a positive price 
shock. In the SVAR analysis below, this estimate of the conditional 
variance is used for crude oil price volatility. The oil price data series 
and estimated volatility series are shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1. Nominal Oil Price, monthly % change 
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Nominal Brent Oil Price, monthly % change
 
Note: Original data is Brent spot oil price, monthly average. Sample 
period is January 1970 to May 2011. 
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Figure 2. Oil price volatility, estimated with EGARCH model. 
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Oil price volatility from EGARCH model
 
Note: Original data is Brent spot oil price, monthly average. Sample 
period used for EGARCH estimation is January 1970 to May 
2011. 
 
4-2. The Hamilton Index and the Inverse Hamilton Index 
 Some of the previous literature focused on the asymmetric 
character of an oil price shock on industrial activity. For an oil exporter, 
especially for a country like Nigeria, whose economy is heavily 
dependent on oil revenues, sharp jumps and drops in the international 
oil price may have special effects on the macro-economy and these 
should be linked to special actions by the authorities. Thus, this 
analysis employs a Hamilton Index, introduced by Hamilton (1996) and 
applied by Ahmed and Wadud (2011). The HI extracts the net increase 
in the oil price as below. 
   (3) 
(maxop: maximum oil price in the past one year) 
In the same manner, but in the opposite way, this analysis sets 
up the Inverse HI, which is generated as in equation (4). 
(4) 
(minop: minimum oil price in the past one year) 
To calculate HI and Inverse HI, the Brent oil price in a natural 
logarithm is used. Both series are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Comparing 
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with oil price and volatility data, every series shows a different 
movement. This supports the need for different variables. 
 
Figure 3. Hamilton Index (1971M01-2011M05) 
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Hamilton Index (1971M01-2011M05)
 
Note: Original data is Brent spot oil price, monthly average. Sample 
period used for calculation is January 1970 to May 2011. 
 
Figure 4. Inverse Hamilton Index (1971M01-2011M05) 
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Inverse Hamilton Index (1971M01-2011M05)
 
Note: Original data is Brent spot oil price, monthly average. Sample 
period used for calculation is January 1970 to May 2011. In SVAR 
estimation the sign is converted. 
  
4-3. The SVAR model estimation  
 For an econometric analysis of the impact of the international 
oil price on Nigeria’s economy, the existing literature suggests using a 
sample data range from 1986 when the oil price fell precipitously. 1986 
was also the year when Nigeria accepted the SAP and Nigeria’s 
economic behaviour may have changed after 1986. In the meantime, 
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Nigeria introduced the Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market in 1995. 
Since then, the exchange regime has shifted to a managed float regime, 
which possibly affected the exchange rate reaction to a macro-economic 
shock. Moreover, Nigerian government shifted to a civilian regime 
under President Obasanjo in 2000. This may have influenced 
government behaviour by making economic policies more stable and 
responsive than before. The year 2000 can also be regarded as the start 
of a new global resource boom which brought new capital flows into 
Nigeria as well. Based on these considerations, this analysis takes the 
sample time series from January 1970 to May 2011 as a “base period,” 
and three alternative data ranges (before and after 1986, 1995 and 
2000) are applied to compare results and check the robustness of the 
estimation.  
 The estimation of the SVAR below adopts five variables: four 
macro-economic indicators and one variable for the international oil 
price (either percentage changes, a HI, an Inverse HI or Volatility). The 
four indices for the oil price are regarded as exogenous to other 
macro-economic variables. Every variable is tested for the existence of a 
unit root before the SVAR estimation using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test applying Schwartz Information Criteria. All the 
variables, except for the HI, the Inverse HI and Volatility become stable 
after taking first order difference, so these variables are used in first 
order log difference form. Volatility, HI, and Inverse HI are diagnosed 
as having no unit root, and the last two variables are taken in log form, 
while Volatility data are used as they are estimated in the EGARCH 
model.  
 
 To analyse the impact of the international oil price on Nigeria’s 
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economy, a SVAR model is constructed as in equation (5). 
     (5) 
is a lag operator. Here, , 
and . , , and  are 
coefficient vectors. Equation (5) is rewritten in a reduced form as 
below. 
   (6) 
In equation (6), p denotes lag order, and  is the  error vector. 
  Regarding the identification restriction, based on Amisano and 
Giannini (1997), consider the model in equation (7). 
  (7) 
Here, is the residual obtained from equation (6), and is an 
unobserved innovation. Both  and  are  vectors. To estimate 
 and , zero restrictions on the vectors are set as identification 
restrictions, based on Kim and Roubini (2000) and Ahmed and Wadud 
(2011).  
 =     (8) 
In equation (8), the subscript oilprice denotes either oil price percentage 
change (OP), HI, Inverse HI, or Volatility. This restriction can be 
interpreted as assuming that CPI responds to shocks in M2, Oil Price, 
Discount Rate and Exchange Rate instantaneously, i.e. in this analysis, 
within a month. In the same way, M2 is affected by and responds to Oil 
Price and Discount Rate within the same period, but responds to CPI 
and Exchange Rate with a time lag of at least one period. In this model, 
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the international oil price is regarded as exogenous to the Nigerian 
economy, thus Oil Price is not affected by any other variables, at least 
within the month. Nigeria is the major oil producer in the African 
continent together with Libya. Indeed, attacks on the oil refineries and 
the kidnapping of foreign engineers by the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta in the Niger Delta region was reported 
to have been one cause of the international oil price increase from 2006 
to 2007. This notwithstanding, in general, Nigeria’s production can be 
considered to be not large enough to affect the international oil price, 
thus this assumption is appropriate.  
Discount Rate is affected instantaneously by Oil Price, but it 
responds to CPI, M2 and Exchange Rate after a time lag of at least one 
period. This is based on the assumption that it takes at least one month 
for policy makers to observe a price increase and to react to set a new 
exchange rate, as was pointed out by Kim and Roubini (2000). Finally, 
Exchange Rate instantaneously responds to M2, Oil Price and Discount 
Rate, but it responds to CPI after a lag of one period. Regarding the 
assumption on the identification restriction above, both Kim and 
Roubini (2000) and Ahmed and Wadud (2011) assume that Exchange 
Rate is affected by all the other variables within a month. However, the 
assumption that the effects pass through from innovation in CPI to 
Exchange Rate within the same period is rather strong, thus  is 
given a zero restriction in this analysis. To check the robustness of this 
restriction, an alternative restriction is also applied, where Exchange 
Rate is assumed to be affected by all the other variables within a period, 
and the instantaneous Discount Rate shock on CPI is set to zero (  in 
equation 8). This does not significantly change the estimation results.  
 Applying Akaike Information Criteria, the tests for lag length 
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indicated that no lag is appropriate. However, the purpose of this model 
is to see the influence over time, and the variables are expected to affect 
each other in the course of time. Thus, after testing several lag lengths 
on the basis of the literature, 10 term lags are included. 
 
4-4. Estimation Results 
4-4-1. Volatility  
 The result of the EGARCH model estimation is as below (numbers 
in parenthesis are standard deviations, ** and * denote 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively).  
    (9) 
 
As mentioned in 4-1, if the last coefficient is negative, this indicates a 
larger influence from a negative price shock than from a positive price 
shock. In this estimation, however, the last coefficient is neither 
negative nor statistically significant, and it fails to show the asymmetry 
of oil price shocks on volatility. Alternatively, volatility is estimated for 
the period from January 1986 to May 2011. In this case,  is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, but again fails to show any 
stronger influence from a negative price change. 
   
4-4-2. The SVAR  
[Exchange Rate] 
 Figure 5 shows the impulse response of Exchange Rate to an 
innovation in Oil Price. This shows a response with three to four month 
lags. The response of Exchange Rate to HI (that is, a price hike) is not 
statistically significant (for all the other alternative sample periods), 
but it does respond to the other three oil price indices, and these 
(1.484)    (0.074)         (0.057)         (0.308) 
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responses are statistically significant. Exchange Rate (here denoted as 
naira per US dollar) appreciates against an innovation in OP. In 
contrast, Exchange Rate depreciates against an innovation either in 
Inverse HI (i.e. an acute price drop) or Volatility. These results are 
robust for almost all the other alternative sample periods, except for 
the response to the change in OP and Inverse HI for the sample period 
from January 1995 to May 2011, which were not statistically 
significant. 
 Nigeria’s exchange rates were fixed until 1995, so it is possible that 
the exchange rate did not respond to the oil price change before 1995. 
However, the estimation result does not change when the sample period 
is limited to the period from January 1970 to December 1994. This 
implies that the influence of the international oil price has been quite 
strong, and that Nigeria’s exchange rate has been responding relatively 
flexibly to price shocks regardless of the exchange regime.  
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Figure 5. Accumulated Impulse Response of Exchange Rate to an 
innovation in Oil Price  
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Note: Doted lines indicate the confidence interval, ± 2 standard 
deviations. Sample period: January 1970-May 2011  
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Figure 6. Accumulated Impulse Response of M2 to an innovation in Oil 
Price  
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Note: Doted lines indicate the confidence interval, ± 2 standard 
deviations. Sample period: January 1970-May 2011  
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[M2] 
 Figure 6 shows the response of M2 to an innovation in Oil Price. M2 
responds positively and statistically significantly to OP and HI, 
indicating increases in the money supply after an oil price increase. In 
the meantime, M2 shows a negative and statistically significant 
response to Inverse HI for the first 12 months. This remains unchanged 
for the sample period January 1986, but when the period is limited to 
after January 1995 and after January 2000, this response ceased to 
appear. M2 does not show any significant response to Volatility at any 
sample period. 
 One possible reason for the increase in the money supply is the 
surge in the government’s liabilities to domestic private banks as well 
as to the central bank. In Nigeria’s recent past, government 
expenditure increased as the international oil price rose and revenues 
increased. The expanded budget during the oil boom was maintained 
even after the oil price fell and revenues decreased (Budina et al. 2007). 
First, the budget deficit was financed by borrowing from foreign 
financial institutions, but then it shifted to borrowing from domestic 
banks. In such a case, however, the increase in the money supply as a 
response to the oil price shock will be associated with longer time lags. 
Another reason for an increase in the money supply, which seems more 
pertinent here, is the supply of oil revenues to the domestic market by 
the NNPC and the international oil companies. The NNPC, in fact, 
deposits a fraction of crude oil sales revenues in local currency in the 
CBN, and this will affect domestic money supply. The central bank is 
supposed to intervene to neutralise this, but the estimation results 
suggest that the intervention is insufficient, or that the influence of the 
NNPC and the international oil companies is far stronger than any 
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financial measure by the CBN.  
 
Figure 7. Accumulated Impulse Response of CPI to an innovation in M2 
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Note: Doted lines indicate the confidence interval, ± 2 standard 
deviations. The variable for the oil price change in the estimated 
model is OP. Sample period: January 1970-May 2011  
 
Figure 8. Accumulated Impulse Response of Discountr Rate to an 
innovation in Oil Price  
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Note: Doted lines indicate the confidence interval, ± 2 standard 
deviations. Sample period: January 1970-May 2011  
 
[CPI] 
 Nigeria’s domestic price levels show no direct response to any 
innovation in any of the four oil price indices. According to economic 
theory, it is expected that domestic prices in an oil exporting country 
will fall due to an improvement in the terms of trade after an oil price 
increase, especially in an economy like Nigeria, which is very 
dependent on imported goods and foods. CPI, however, shows no 
statistically significant response to Exchange Rate. On the other hand, 
CPI responds positively and statistically significantly to a shock in M2 
(Figure 7). Because an oil price increase leads to an increase in M2 as 
shown above, this indicates that price levels are indirectly affected by 
the international oil price. In other words, the influence from an oil 
price shock through its effect on the money supply is larger than any 
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effects that might come from any improvement in the terms of trade. 
 One more possible reason for the lack of any response by Nigeria’s 
CPI to an oil price shock can be explained by Nigeria’s industrial 
structure. In their analysis of Malaysia, Ahmed and Wadud (2011) 
suggested that, given that the Malaysian government possesses large 
stakes in the oil industry, an oil price increase results in a rise in 
government revenues in the short term that stimulates industrial 
activity. However, in the longer term, the oil price increase also means 
higher costs for industrial inputs, so it leads to economic stagnation and 
inflation. In Nigeria’s case, in contrast, while the government also holds 
huge stakes in the oil industry, the industrial sector is relatively 
quiescent, and the impact of an oil price shock as an input cost is small. 
[Discount Rate] 
 Figure 8 shows the response of Discount Rate to an innovation in 
Oil Price. Discount Rate does not show statistically significant 
responses to any of the four Oil Price indices. As mentioned above, 
Exchange Rate responds to an Oil Price shock, as does M2. However, 
Discount Rate shows no response to M2. This result is robust when 
other alternative sample periods are applied, indicating that there has 
been no effective reaction to the shock in the economy by the CBN, 
either to an acute oil price increase (HI) or to a sharp drop (Inverse HI).
  
 Regarding the results above, the impact of oil price volatility is 
noteworthy. Ahmed and Wadud suggest that oil price volatility has a 
negative influence on demand in a developing economy such as 
Malaysia through its influence on price levels like it does in an 
industrialized country. This result, however, was not proved in the case 
of the African oil exporter, Nigeria. On the other hand, Nigeria’s 
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exchange rate significantly depreciates when there is an increase in 
volatility of the international oil price, and this is robust for alternative 
sample periods. This point has not been made in the existing literature. 
Moreover, the correlation coefficient of Volatility and Inverse HI is 
0.501, suggesting that Volatility is not necessarily too strongly 
correlated to a fall in the oil price. Thus it can be understood that 
Volatility has its own influence on the exchange rate, apart from oil 
price hike or drop. This result, that oil price volatility influences the 
exchange rate, indicates that the major money suppliers, namely the 
NNPC and the international oil companies, refrain from releasing 
foreign currency onto the domestic market (in other words, they avoid 
holding local currency) when the oil price is unstable, while demand for 
foreign currency rises when the oil price fluctuates. The latter leads to a 
depreciation of the naira.  
 
 4-4-3. Variance Decomposition 
 The major results for the impulse response functions explained 
above are robust for alternative sample periods. This section looks into 
whether the power of the influences among the variables changes 
depending on the sample period. When the results of the variance 
decomposition in the different sample periods are compared, a 
variable’s contribution ratio to explain other variables’ variance is 
relatively low, staying at 6 to 7% for the highest variable for the period 
from January 1970 to May 2011, but when the sample is limited to the 
period from January 2000 to May 2011, the contribution ratio rises. For 
instance, a percentage change in the oil price explains 18% of the 
variation in the Exchange Rate for the sample period January 2000 to 
May 2011 (Figure 9). This implies that the economic liberalization in 
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Nigeria’s economy after 2000 relaxed the restraints on economic factors, 
which had been fixed or tightly controlled before, so that the economy 
could react relatively flexibly to exogenous economic shocks. In other 
words, a shock in the international oil price now passes through 
macro-economic factors more smoothly than before. 
Figure 9. Variance Decompositions  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
 1970M01-2011M05
 2000M01-2011M05
Variance Decomposition of M2 to Shock of Oil Price Change
 
0
5
10
15
20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
 1970M01-2011M05
 2000M01-2011M05
Variance Decomposition of Exchange Rate to Shock of Oil Price Change
 
Note: Calculated from the SVAR model. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This analysis examined the impact of the international oil price 
on the economy of an African oil exporter, Nigeria. It has shown that a 
change in the oil price and price uncertainty has a strong influence on 
Nigeria’s exchange rate, while the direct impact of the international oil 
price on Nigeria’s domestic price levels has not been confirmed. The 
results also indicate that the money supply is influenced by increases in 
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the oil price. Moreover, the results indicate that the monetary authority 
does not react to exogenous shocks by controlling the policy interest 
rate. 
 Returning to the context of the “resource curse” literature, the 
conclusions of preceding studies on the economic performance of 
resource rich developing countries are mixed. Some argue that resource 
endowment is negatively correlated to economic performance in the 
medium- to long-term, thus a “resource curse” exists, while others 
suggest that there is no difference between the economic performance of 
resource rich and resource poor developing countries, which implies 
that there is no such a thing as a “resource curse.” This analysis 
investigated the macro-economic behaviour of a resource rich country, 
taking an external shock, a change in the international oil price, as a 
key to explain the mechanism of the resource curse. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to offer support for either side of this debate. 
However, based on a time series analysis using monthly data, it has 
been shown that Nigeria’s economy is indeed affected by the 
international oil price, not only with respect to any change in the crude 
oil price but also with regard to oil price volatility. The bottom line is 
that a heavy dependence on crude oil exports exposes the economy to 
international price shocks that disturb the domestic macro-economy, 
mainly because of the strong influence of the change in the price of oil 
price on the exchange rate.  
 This amounts to saying that the economy suffers from 
pro-cyclicality and is thus vulnerable to external negative shocks. For 
an oil exporting country, a drop in the international crude oil price 
results in a decrease in government revenues as well as in a 
depreciation of the local currency. Moreover, as the oil price drops, the 
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cost of the country’s imports rise and the country’s purchasing power 
weakens. According to Nigeria’s recent history, economic problems, 
such as government budget deficits and high inflation, become 
especially prominent after a drop in the international oil price. These 
problems are closely related, thus Nigeria’s economy is pro-cyclical with 
regard to any shock in the international oil price. Today, Nigeria’s 
economy heavily and increasingly depends on imports of intermediary 
inputs, petroleum products such as gasoline (because there is a lack of 
domestic refining capacity), and food, due to a deteriorating 
agricultural sector, which has been further aggravated by high 
population growth. These imports are essential to the economy and 
price elasticity of demand is low. This indicates that a reduction in 
purchasing power for imported goods places a large burden on Nigeria’s 
economy. As Nissanke points out, in general, the government in a 
pro-cyclical economy faces tough and strict austerity adjustments 
during an economic downturn (Nissanke 2010:83). To avoid repeating 
the economic stagnation of the 1980s, the government needs to 
establish a policy which can be implemented in times of unfavourable 
oil prices.   
 Lastly, this analysis has suggested the possibility of a strong 
influence of the national oil company and international oil companies 
on the domestic economy, especially through their behaviour in the 
foreign exchange market. In other words, international oil price 
movements affect the oil exporter’s economy through the existence of 
these large oil companies, which are the main suppliers of foreign 
currency and operate under only limited control from the monetary 
authority. As the economy becomes more closely connected to the 
international financial market, which is associated with increasingly 
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active movements in the domestic currency market, the influence on 
Nigeria’s economy of these oil companies is expected to become stronger. 
Further study in this area is a task for the future. 
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